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The blind spots of liberal citizenship and
integration policy
ALEKSANDRA LEWICKI
ABSTRACT Governments across Europe have stepped up their efforts to manage
social diversity politically, often speciﬁcally targeting Muslim populations.
Lewicki interrogates the policy tools that the British and German governments
deploy to ‘integrate’ an increasingly stigmatized and racialized population,
zooming in on whether and how they problematize patterns of inequality.
Complicating the ‘one country, one citizenship’ rationale of the citizenship regime
literature that assumes a one-dimensional interpretation of history, cultural
identity, political institutions or legal norms, she points to four salient liberal
citizenship discourses that currently frame policies of diversity management.
These are civic republicanism, multiculturalism, civic universalism and
cosmopolitanism. Her analysis demonstrates that all four liberal citizenship
discourses have blind spots when it comes to problematizing structural
hierarchies and the logics of racism. Over the last two decades, liberal citizenship
and integration policy frameworks have thus contributed to the retention of
binary distinctions between superior citizens and inferior Others, distinctions that
can now easily be exacerbated and used for mobilization by right-wing populist
movements.
KEYWORDS citizenship, integration policy, Islamophobia, Muslims in Europe, social
diversity, structural inequalities
Regardless of their stance on immigration, there seems to be an agreementamong European governments that the management of social diver-
sity is in dire need of political attention. Many initiatives in this area
ﬁgure as ‘integration measures’ and speciﬁcally target Muslim popu-
lations. This article interrogates the policy tools that liberal European gov-
ernments deploy to ‘integrate’ an increasingly racialized population. It
examines and compares the discursive framing of policies adopted in
two national settings, Britain and Germany, over the course of the last
decade, and scrutinizes their capacity to problematize inequalities that
affect individuals who self-describe as Muslim or are perceived as such
by others.
The analysis draws on and contributes to the literature that investigates how
governments manage and regulate immigration and diversity. A growing
body of works analyse such policy frameworks as part of a polity’s conceptual
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approach to citizenship.1 This literature has offered a typology of citizenship
regimes, distinguishing for instance ‘monist’, ‘assimilationist’, ‘pluralist’ and
‘multicultural’ incorporation models.2 Germany, for example, is often referred
to as an ethnocentric assimilatory-restrictive citizenship regime, while the
United Kingdom is seen to epitomize a multicultural state. This perspective
stresses the signiﬁcance of the nation-state in determining the contours of citi-
zenship and emphasizes the continuing differences of European citizenship
models. Another stream within this literature, prominently represented by
Yasemin Soysal or Christian Joppke,3 argues that European models converge
around supranational commitments to basic rights and political inclusiveness.
Whether scholars in this ﬁeld conclude that the German and British
approaches to citizenship converge or continue to differ, they tend to describe
convergence or divergence as revolving around one speciﬁc and seemingly
one-directional (national or supranational) ‘model’, ‘regime’ or discursive
rationale, such as, for instance, community cohesion, postnationalism or
civic universalism. They thereby implicitly or explicitly presume that laws,
institutions and public values are underpinned by a monolithic account of
history, identity and ‘dominant culture’. The ‘modelling’ of citizenship has
thus been subject to critique from diverse angles,4 as the assumed neatness
of regimes renders these more stable than they actually are.5
1 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press 1992); Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration
and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998);
Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1994); Ruud Koopmans, Paul
Statham, Marco Guigni and Florence Passy, Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cul-
tural Diversity in Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2005); Tariq
Modood, Post-Immigration ‘Difference’ and Integration: The Case of Muslims in Western
Europe (London: British Academy Policy Centre 2012); Marc Helbling (ed.), Islamophobia
in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes (London and New York: Rout-
ledge 2012); Manlio Cinalli and Marco Giugni, ‘Public discourses about Muslims and
Islam in Europe’, Ethnicities, vol. 13, no. 2, 2013, 131–46.
2 See, for example, Koopmans, Statham, Guigni and Passy, Contested Citizenship, 10.
3 Soysal, Limits of Citizenship; Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration (Cambridge
and Malden, MA: Polity Press 2010).
4 Hassan Bousetta, ‘Institutional theories of immigrant ethnic mobilisation: relevance
and limitations’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 26, no. 2, 2000, 229–45;
Davide Però and John Solomos, ‘Introduction: Migration politics and mobilization:
exclusion, engagements, incorporation’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 33, no. 1, 2010,
1–18; Rogier van Reekum, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Christophe Bertossi, ‘National
models of integration and the crisis of multiculturalism: a critical comparative perspec-
tive’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 46, no. 5, 2012, 417–26; Peter Scholten, ‘Between national
models and multi-level decoupling: the pursuit of multi-level governance in Dutch and
UK policies towards migrant incorporation’, International Migration and Integration, vol.
17, no. 4, 2016, 973–94.
5 Veit Bader, ‘The governance of Islam in Europe: the perils of modelling’, Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 33, no. 6, 2007, 871–86.
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Departing from a research agenda that understands citizenship as a ﬁxed set
of rules, procedures and values, this article seeks to account explicitly for its
contested features. I propose to analyse citizenship as continuously subject
to hegemonic struggles over distinct viewpoints and competing interpret-
ations of institutional arrangements. The contention that this approach
implies for citizenship regime studies is that laws, political institutions,
history, cultural values and ideas of democracy do not have the same
meaning for all discussants. Rather, different social actors ﬁll these concepts
with distinct discursive content. The analysis of policy frameworks thus
needs to account more explicitly for how laws, institutions or social norms
are continuously amenable to different interpretations.
As I will show in greater detail below, four salient citizenship dis-
courses predominantly frame policies of diversity management at
present. These are civic republicanism, multiculturalism, civic universal-
ism and cosmopolitanism. While these four discourses are made use of
in distinct European settings, they also share common features. This
article traces the discursive resources the four schemes offer to challenge
patterns of inequality.6
There is considerable comparative evidence to suggest that Islamophobia
currently constitutes a highly salient form of racism in Britain and
Germany.7 Those perceived or self-describing as Muslims, across several gen-
erations, have been disproportionately disadvantaged in key areas of social
life, including the German and British labour and housing markets,8 and the
education and criminal justice systems.9 Islamic practices are furthermore fre-
quently subject to regulatory restrictions across Europe.10 These patterns of
inequality can be traced to the persistence of colonial distinctions between
superior Europeans and inferior ‘non-Europeans’ that are part of both
countries’ histories, to the unequal global distribution of resources, and to
capitalism’s pull for cheap migrant labour; they can further be related to
6 I assume that manifestations of domination, oppression or exploitation can be chal-
lenged more easily if mainstream discourses allow individuals to categorize and
assess their social position as unjust rather than simply as unfortunate. If interpretative
schemes that specify asymmetries are more difﬁcult to access or are discredited, indi-
viduals are more likely to perceive an inferior status as deserved or justiﬁed: see, for
example, Nancy Fraser, ‘On justice: lessons from Plato, Rawls and Ishiguro’, New Left
Review, vol. 74, March–April 2012, 41–51 (46).
7 Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, ‘Refutations of racism in the “Muslim question”’, Pat-
terns of Prejudice, vol. 43, no. 3–4, 2009, 335–54; Yasemin Shooman, ‘…weil ihre Kultur so
ist’: Narrative des antimuslimischen Rassismus (Bielefeld: Transcript 2014).
8 Pamela Irving Jackson and Peter Doerschler, Benchmarking Muslim Well-Being in Europe:
Reducing Disparities and Polarizations (Bristol: Policy Press 2012).
9 Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez (eds), European Islamophobia Report 2016 (Istanbul: SETA
2017).
10 Ibid. See also Schirin Amir-Moazami, ‘Framing Muslims or reframing the questions:
notes on the “Muslim question” in Europe’, in Omar Kasmani and Stefan Maneval
(eds), Muslim Matter (Berlin: Revolver Publishing 2016), 21–6.
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some of the logics of liberal representative democracy, as well as to wide-
spread perception that Muslim norms are distinct from or even in opposition
to what are framed as secular Christian practices.11 In summary, these asym-
metries are related to what Nancy Fraser described as economic, political and
cultural structural inequalities.12 While these forms of asymmetry of course
signiﬁcantly overlap and impact on each other, her distinction broadens our
notion of inequality by pointing to its structural anchoring within the cultural,
political or economic orders of society.13
Bringing these considerations together, I argue that citizenship is shaped by
competing discourses that provide distinct means to problematize contempor-
ary structural inequalities. The contention this approach implies for citizen-
ship studies is twofold. First, my intervention complicates the ‘one country,
one citizenship’ rationale of the citizenship regime literature that assumes a
one-dimensional interpretation of history, cultural identity, political insti-
tutions and legal norms by identifying four salient citizenship discourses
that offer varying perspectives on diversity management. Second, the analysis
demonstrates that all four inﬂuential citizenship discourses have blind spots
when it comes to problematizing structural asymmetries in diverse societies.
While scholarship has shown how policies of immigration control sustain
binary distinctions between the rights of ‘insiders’ and ‘others’,14 this article
illustrates how integration policy frameworks, despite their intention to
improve democratic relations, also perpetuate structural hierarchies, and
thus uphold the logics and rationalities of racism. It becomes evident that
liberal citizenship and integration policy frameworks have contributed to
the retention of binary distinctions between superior citizens and inferior
Others that can now easily be exacerbated and used for mobilization by
right-wing populist movements, as exempliﬁed by the Brexit campaign con-
ducted by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP),15 or the political
programme of Germany’s right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutsch-
land (AFD).16
11 For a detailed elaboration, see Aleksandra Lewicki, ‘Race, religion and social justice’, in
Gary Craig (ed.), Global Handbook of Social Justice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2017
forthcoming).
12 Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press 2008).
13 Lewicki, ‘Race, religion and social justice’.
14 Bridget Anderson, Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2013).
15 Aaron Winter, ‘Brexit and Trump: racism, the far-right and violence’, 3 April 2017,
available on the University of Bath Blogs website at http://blogs.bath.ac.uk/iprblog/
2017/04/03/brexit-and-trump-on-racism-the-far-right-and-violence (viewed 4 October
2017).
16 Alternative für Deutschland, Programm für Deutschland, 30 April–1 May 2016, available
on the Alternative für Deutschland website at https://alternativefuer.de/wp-content/
uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (viewed
4 October 2016).
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Methodology
While an exploration of the conditions of possibility for current policy frame-
works would require in-depth analysis of both countries’ colonial and immi-
gration histories, this analysis pursues a more modest aim in that it merely
zooms in on the discursive resources that frame contemporary policies.
In the citizenship literature, Britain and Germany ﬁgure as the ‘most dis-
tinct’ cases in terms of their approaches to diversity management. Their
varying policy frameworks originate in the two countries’ speciﬁc histories
of colonialism, their experiences with post-war immigration,17 and their
most recent attempts to regulate access to rights and integration.
While Germany was forced to give up its colonial aspirations following the
First World War, the legacy of the British Empire was most notably shaped by
post-Second World War immigration to the United Kingdom. Immigrants
from the British Commonwealth, including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh,
ﬁgured as ‘subjects of the Crown’and thus held the right to vote in British elec-
tions. Germany’s post-First World War immigration, in contrast, served to ﬁll
gaps in the labour market in order to enable economic prosperity, and
involved targeted recruitment programmes for ‘guestworkers’ from low-
waged countries such as Turkey, Italy, Greece and so on. Those new arrivals
who later settled permanently in Germany were, until recently, barred from
voting. As a result of such divergent access rules, UK-based minority repre-
sentative bodies tend to speak on behalf of an electorate, and thus to form
more professionalized lobby organizations.
More recent policies of immigration management have also followed
varying trajectories. While Germany insisted on a transitional closure of its
labour market for citizens from new European Union (EU) member states,
the British New Labour government immediately received EU migrants
from Eastern Europe. And whereas Britain responded to the humanitarian
crisis in Syria by refusing to take in adult refugees, Germany accepted a sig-
niﬁcant number of asylum applicants from this region.
While these histories shape the terms and scope of diversity manage-
ment strategies, this article also identiﬁes certain analogies in relation to
how social problems are currently narrated, and policy solutions deployed
across European settings. One reason may be that diversity management is
increasingly negotiated among the local, national and European levels
of policymaking.18 Another focal point, I suggest in this article, is the
heightened attention given to the ‘Muslim question’ in Europe, thus the
assumption that the presence of Muslim populations calls for novel,
17 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany; Favell, Philosophies of Inte-
gration; Sarah Hackett, Foreigners, Minorities and Integration: The Muslim Immigrant
Experience in Britain and Germany (Manchester and New York: Manchester University
Press 2013).
18 Scholten, ‘Between national models and multi-level decoupling’.
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mostly restrictive, regulatory responses.19 European governments have
stepped up their efforts to engage with Muslim organizations over the
last ﬁfteen years. While this has enabled community representatives to
enter decision-making circles and raise awareness of their political
claims,20 the initiatives are largely driven by a securitized agenda,21 inter-
vening in Muslim organizational structures and activities,22 and thus limit-
ing the possibilities of real dialogue.
The data on which this article draws originate from such interactions.
The information is based on an analysis of policy documents and semi-
structured qualitative interviews with policymakers and representatives of
Muslim organizations who have been involved in the ‘making’ of inte-
gration policy in Britain and Germany. The material includes political
speeches, strategy papers, commission reports, research conducted by gov-
ernment departments and enquiries published by British and German gov-
ernments or voluntary organizations between 2001 and 2016. These include,
for instance, the Casey Review,23 commissioned by the British government,
and the policy recommendations passed by the Deutsche Islam Konferenz
(German Islam Conference), a consultation body that aims to advance the
integration of Muslims. Fifty-four research interviews were conducted
over the course of two research projects between 2007 and 2014. Respon-
dents were approached when their names appeared in policy reports, via
government departments in charge of speciﬁc consultations, as well as by
means of snowballing techniques. Interview questions mainly prompted
engagement with the negotiation of speciﬁc policy measures, while data
analysis focused on how actors deﬁned social problems and policy
solutions.
Based on this material, I identiﬁed the four most salient discursive for-
mations. To sketch the contours of their ideas of citizenship and integration,
I draw on scholarly contributions by Robert Putnam to shed light
19 As an analogy to the ‘Jewish question’ in the twentieth century, scholarship has noted
the emergence of a ‘Muslim question’ in academic and public debates in the twenty-
ﬁrst century; see Meer and Modood, ‘Refutations of racism in the “Muslim question”’;
and Amir-Moazami, ‘Framing Muslims or reframing the questions’. The term accounts
for the problematization and racialization of Muslims in Europe.
20 Aleksandra Lewicki and Therese O’Toole, ‘Acts and practices of citizenship: Muslim
women’s activism in the UK’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 40, no. 1, 2017, 152–71.
21 Jonathan Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims. The State’s Role in Minority
Integration (Princeton, NJ and Woodstock, Oxon.: Princeton University Press 2012).
22 Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, ‘Lobbying for civil and religious rights of immigrants and
Muslims: desecuritization strategies of Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany’,
International Migration and Integration, vol. 15, no. 3, 2014, 411–30.
23 Louise Casey, The Casey Review: A Review into Opportunity and Integration (London:
Department for Communities and Local Government 2016), available on gov.uk at
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/575973/The_
Casey_Review_Report.pdf (viewed 5 September 2017).
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on civic republicanism, 24 Tariq Modood’s work to ﬂesh out multicultural
concerns, 25 Christian Joppke’s writings to sketch civic universal arguments,26
and Saskia Sassen’s ideas to outline cosmopolitanism.27 I do not suggest that
these four scholars are responsible for the way their arguments are adopted
in public debates. Rather, I highlight certain analogies of reasoning within
academic and empirical debates to illustrate how the four interpretative
schemes frame discussion of the ‘Muslim question’ in Europe. The following
sections discuss the conceptual and empirical insights that resulted from this
analysis.
Civic republicanism
The concept of social capital as it has been used by Robert Putnam has gained
high salience in scholarly debates on the quality of democracy in diverse
societies.28 His work is focused on the micro-level of interpersonal relation-
ships, as well as individuals’mutual perceptions of each other and their collec-
tive self-understanding.
From this point of view, the quality of democracy stands and falls with
citizens’ self-identiﬁcation as members of the political community. Demo-
cratic subjectivity unfolds through the interpersonal mingling and
mixing that creates solidarity, a necessary precondition for democracy.
Putnam ﬁnds a higher level of social disconnectedness and lower levels
of community attachment in ethnically diversiﬁed localities.29 The crucial
instrument against the erosion of community ties is a sense of social
unity, deﬁned in terms of social capital as ‘networks and the associated
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness’.30 Putnam suggests that civil
associations transform self-seeking, private or isolated individuals into a
public-spirited collectivity capable of acting for the common good. To
facilitate integration, governments need to generate networks and norms
of reciprocity and foster a sense of shared citizenship by encouraging
socializing and volunteering.
The civic republican lens has become popular among governments across
Europe. Key expert enquiries—such as the study by the Bundesamt für
Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Ofﬁce for Migration and Refugee),
24 Robert D. Putnam, ‘E pluribus unum: diversity and community in the twenty-ﬁrst
century’, Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 2007, 137–74.
25 Modood, Post-Immigration ‘Difference’ and Integration.
26 Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration.
27 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages [2006],
2nd edn (Princeton, NJ and Woodstock, Oxon.: Princeton University Press 2008).
28 Putnam, ‘E pluribus unum’.
29 Ibid., 149.
30 Ibid., 137.
ALEKSANDRA LEWICKI 381
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
47
.14
7.4
9.3
7]
 at
 05
:38
 12
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
18
 
Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland (Muslim Life in Germany),31 or the British
report initiated in response to the 7/7 terrorist attack in London by the Com-
mission on Integration and Cohesion, Our Shared Future32—use social capital
as the chief indicator of integration. Both documents, as well as the integration
strategy paper issued by David Cameron’s coalition government,33 and the
Casey Review,34 commissioned by the succeeding Conservative government,
assess whether people ‘get on well together’ and highlight the frequency of
contact between individuals from different backgrounds.
Former German Home Secretary Wolfgang Schäuble, who currently holds
the post of Finance Minister, initiated a formal dialogue with Muslim commu-
nity representatives in the German Islam Conference. In his speeches, he expli-
citly establishes a link between cultural diversity and the decline of traditional
values that, in his view, threatens social unity and leads to as diverse phenom-
ena as heightened youth crime, anti-social behaviour and violent extremism.35
He reasons that faith communities provide the type of ties that bind, namely
value-based identiﬁcation with a wider collective. However, in Schäuble’s
view, Muslim communities generally fail to deliver these social goods.
Unfortunately, according to many studies and opinion polls, in many Euro-
pean countries Muslim communities are far from being seen as valuable contri-
butors to our common good. That is, of course, partly fallout from the
horrendous terror and repeated threats against our liberties that are being
brought forward by extremist Muslims claiming to act on behalf of Islam.
But it is, unfortunately, also in part a reﬂection on missing or at least not so
visible contributions Islamic organizations make to advance social cohesion
and closely knitted community life of all people of all faiths.36
To Schäuble, the ‘failure to contribute’ is manifested in what he perceives as
cultural difference: immigrants’ ‘clinging to traditional values’.37 In this
instance, the civic republican lens informs generalizing perceptions of a homo-
geneous value-based collective whose coherent value-set is perceived as an
obstacle to its ability to contribute to society.
31 Sonja Haug, Stephanie Müssig and Anja Stichs, Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland: Im
Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz (Nuremberg: Bundesamt für Migration und
Flüchtlinge 2009).
32 Commission on Integration and Cohesion, Our Shared Future (Wetherby, Yorks: Com-
mission on Integration and Cohesion 2007).
33 Communities and Local Government, Creating the Conditions for Integration (London:
Department for Communities and Local Government 2012).
34 Casey, The Casey Review.
35 Wolfgang Schäuble, ‘Was uns verbindet’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 May 2009.
36 Wolfgang Schäuble, ‘Integration and diversity: state and religion in the pluralistic
society’, Leo Baeck Institute London Annual Report of Activities 2009 (London: Leo
Baeck Institute 2009), 9–17 (16).
37 Ibid.
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In the United Kingdom, the so-called ‘Cantle Report’, commissioned to
evaluate a series of escalating tensions in the North of England in 2001,
describes the ‘complete separation of communities based on religion, edu-
cation, housing, culture, employment etc.’, manifested in a ‘lack of contact
with, and absence of knowledge about, each other’s communities’ that ‘lead
to the growth of fear and conﬂict’.38 It offers a depoliticized cultural expla-
nation for tensions in an area that is affected by de-industrialization and
socio-economic deprivation. Although the report notes disadvantages in
housing and employment, it argues that
many of the present problems seem to owe a great deal to the failure to com-
municate and agree on a set of clear values that can govern behaviour. This
failure is evident at both the national and local levels, and it has led to commu-
nity breakdown in some parts of the country.39
Similar to Putnam’s diagnosis that people trust each other less in diverse
neighbourhoods, the report ﬁnds a decline of shared ‘cognitive-affective’
identiﬁcations. The implication is that lack of contact and interaction in
itself creates violent social tensions. Diversity is constructed as a source of cog-
nitive alienation and social ‘disharmony’. A related diagnosis can be found in
the more recent British integration strategy paper, which refers to those
involved in the August 2011 riots as lacking in ‘social responsibility’.40 To
foster shared ‘core values and experience’, the strategy paper encourages
higher levels of volunteering and dialogue between people from different
faith and cultural backgrounds.41 Releasing funding to youth organizations
such as ‘The Scouts Association, Girlguiding UK, Army Cadets, Volunteer
Police Cadets and St John Ambulance’,42 the strategy puts the onus of this
task on the voluntary sector. The Casey Review of December 2016, also struc-
tured by civic republican discursive logic, initially explicitly acknowledges
that the recession had aggravated socio-economic inequalities, and accounts
for the disproportionate disadvantage experienced by Pakistani and Bangla-
deshi populations in Britain. The report relates these, however, to patterns
of ‘ethnic concentration’ and segregation that ‘limit labour market opportu-
nities’ and ‘reduce opportunities for social ties’ and ‘trust’.43 ‘Social mixing
and interaction between people from a wider range of backgrounds’, the
report suggests, can ‘have positive impacts; not just in reducing anxiety and
prejudice, but also in enabling people to get on better in employment and
38 Ted Cantle, Community Cohesion: Report by the Independent Review Team (London: Home
Ofﬁce 2001), 30.
39 Ibid., 18.
40 Communities and Local Government, Creating the Conditions for Integration, 4.
41 Ibid., 4, 10.
42 Ibid., 12.
43 Casey, The Casey Review, 12.
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social mobility’.44 The policy toolkit recommended by the report, unsurpris-
ingly, involves the creation of opportunities for pupils to ‘mix with others
from different backgrounds’ or help with the removal of ‘cultural barriers to
employment’.45
These narratives juxtapose the ideal of the citizen who is surrounded by
reciprocal relationships and spends his/her free time in voluntary work
with alienated ethnic minorities who isolate themselves, do not know
how to behave and hence turn to violence. They project a coherent cultural
behavioural script on to what are perceived as ‘cultural collectives’, thereby
reproducing the logic of racist generalizations and distinctions. Ethnically
homogeneous societies are constructed as uncontested spaces of behaviour-
al conformity, whereas immigrant societies grapple with inherently aggres-
sive citizens who riot and/or plot terrorist activities. Policies deduced from
this understanding reﬂect a preference for political interventions that seek
to alter and reorient minority populations’ cognitive-affective predisposi-
tions as opposed to challenging cultural, economic or political status hier-
archies in society. Rather than redistributing resources and offering
substantial support to disadvantaged groups, these frameworks relate
inequality to community practices, and hence seek to ‘help’ Muslim popu-
lations to adjust their ‘ways of doing things’ by heightening exposure to
what are suggested to be superior lifestyles. While I do not dispute that
solidarity impacts positively on democracy, my analysis suggests that the
focus on engaging young people in voluntary work, or faith-based organ-
izations in interfaith dialogue, is unlikely to address deep-seated political,
economic and cultural inequalities. On the contrary, the civic republican
focus on ‘value aberrance’ masks rather than confronts these forms of
disadvantage.
Multiculturalism
A comprehensive self-identiﬁcation by citizens as ‘we’ is as signiﬁcant for
multiculturalism as it is for civic republicanism. However, multiculturalism
offers a counter-discourse in that it envisages the recognition of minority iden-
tities within such shared imaginaries. I draw on Tariq Modood’s work as he
highlights the signiﬁcance of religion in this context.46
Multiculturalism’s main concern is that citizenship cannot be negotiated on
the majority’s terms only. It promotes the accommodation of minority practices
and their visibility in the public sphere. Integration requires a proportionate
representation of minorities in political institutions and key sectors of society,
including the labour and housing market. A multicultural understanding of
integration stresses the institutional side of politics: ‘The need for integration
44 Ibid., 8.
45 Ibid., 17.
46 Modood, Post-Immigration ‘Difference’ and Integration.
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arises when an established society is faced by people whom it perceives, and
therefore treats, unfavourably by comparison with other members.’47
Multiculturalism has recently faced criticism from high-level politicians and
in key policy reports.48 While this impacts on its perceived legitimacy, political
actors continue to draw on its key arguments to problematize the dispropor-
tionate representation of post-migration populations in low-skilled jobs or
social housing, to enhance representation in political commissions or insti-
tutions, or to challenge the exclusion of Islam from collective self-descriptions
such as ‘Judaeo-Christian’ or ‘Christian’, which are prominent in both the
United Kingdom and Germany.49
Muslim representatives participating in the German Islam Conference, for
instance, call for the recognition of Muslim organizations as ‘corporations of
public law’ (the ofﬁcial status held by Christian and Jewish denominations),
which, among other things, implies representation in key political bodies
and the ability to provide tax-subsidized welfare services.50 Although the
key claim for the status of ‘corporation of public law’ has so far only been
granted to a few Muslim organizations in a limited number of federal
states, negotiations at the Conference led to an endorsement of special
burial facilities for Muslims, the introduction of university institutes in
Islamic theology and state-funded Islamic instruction in German schools.
The Conference furthermore recommended that school curricula need to
include the history of Islam in an explicit manner, promote multilingual pro-
ﬁciency and offer special support to children with immigrant backgrounds.51
Awell-known national umbrella organization in the United Kingdom is the
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). In recent years, the MCB’s lobbying activi-
ties have focused on obtaining statistical data on religious afﬁliation, as well as
on improving legal instruments to combat religious discrimination. The cam-
paign for better data, conducted in collaboration with other faith groups, was
aimed at highlighting public service gaps in areas such as education, health,
housing or employment, while amended equality laws were to assist in
closing these gaps. A question on religion was subsequently included in the
Census in 2001 and 2011, and religion was made equivalent to other protected
characteristics in the Equality Act 2006 and subsequently the Equality Act
47 Ibid., 23.
48 Casey, The Casey Review, 16.
49 See, for example, ‘Kanzlerin Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert’, 16 October 2010,
available on theWelt N24website at www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article10337575/
Kanzlerin-Merkel-erklaert-Multikulti-fuer-gescheitert.html (viewed 13 September
2017); and ‘Prime Minister’s King James Bible speech’, 16 December 2011, available
on the gov.uk website at www.number10.gov.uk/news/king-james-bible (viewed 13
September 2017).
50 Rosenow-Williams, ‘Lobbying for civil and religious rights of immigrants and
Muslims’, 420.
51 Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Drei Jahre Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK) 2006–2009:
Muslime in Deutschland–deutsche Muslime (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Inneren
2009).
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2010. To assist public policy, the MCB recently published a comprehensive
analysis of the demographic and socio-economic proﬁle of Muslims in
Britain.52 It is, however, not only minority actors who advocate multicultural
ideas in British society. Even the former Prime Minister David Cameron, who
distanced himself from state-supported multiculturalism, highlighted the sig-
niﬁcance of increasing Muslims’ political presence in his 2015 speech on
extremism: ‘And it’s not just about representation—it’s about being in pos-
itions of inﬂuence, leadership and political power. That also means more
magistrates, more school governors, moreMembers of Parliament, more coun-
cillors, and yes, Cabinet Ministers too.’53
Key differences in the mobilization of minority actors in both countries are
not only related to the fact that British Muslims have better access to govern-
ment than their German counterparts, and can use varied channels to articu-
late political demands, but also that German debates continue to be
preoccupied with ‘softer’ issues of cultural accommodation, while socio-econ-
omic differentials are more neglected. German authorities and experts often
relate economic inequalities to a lack of social and human capital or ‘edu-
cational underachievement’, a reading that places the responsibility for
social mobility on minorities themselves. There is a higher awareness of the
relevance of discrimination in accounting for such patterns among British
Muslim representatives and high-ranking politicians in Britain.54
Multiculturalism thus offers a contestation of the effects of racism on the
division of labour, and on the exclusion of minorities from processes of
decision-making or collective narratives of belonging. While multiculturalism,
in contrast to civic republicanism, stresses institutional responsibilities and
does not deny cultural, political and economic disadvantages, it is mainly con-
cerned with the cultural roots of socio-economic or political exclusion. Seeking
the inclusion of minority voices in national narratives and institutions, the dis-
course offers less of a challenge to inequalities that can be traced to the post-
colonial world order, that have their roots in the global distribution of
resources or that emerge from the national framing of rights. The discourse
hence does little to eradicate key mechanisms that structurally reproduce
and maintain social hierarchies that align with the logics of race. Even if
anti-Muslim racism lost its current salience in Europe, and Muslims became
a highly valued social group, other collectives would instantly move into
the disadvantaged position vacated by Muslim populations. Furthermore,
52 MCB, British Muslims in Numbers: A Demographic, Socio-Economic and Health Proﬁle of
Muslims in Britain Drawing on the 2011 Census (London: Muslim Council of Britain
2015).
53 ‘Extremism: PM speech’, 20 July 2015, available on the gov.uk website at www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech (viewed 13 September 2017).
54 See, for example, MCB, British Muslims in Numbers; Tony Blair, ‘The duty to integrate:
shared British values’, 8 December 2006, available on the Vigile.québecwebsite at https://
vigile.quebec/articles/the-duty-to-integrate-shared-british-values (viewed 12 October
2017); and ‘Prime Minister’s King James Bible speech’.
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multiculturalism attends to the non-recognition of minority identity, but has
less to say about excessive ascription, a currently highly salient expression
of racism. British and German minority activists feel that religiosity has
become a disproportionately salient category in the ‘war on terror’ and in
public debates, and that people on the street ‘turn them into Muslims’
whether they are religious or not, happy to be labelled as ‘Muslim’ or not.
Multiculturalism, however, prioritizes those who seek equal treatment and
institutional representation for precisely what they perceive as a speciﬁc
identity, as opposed to those who might feel the burden of ascription. While
offering the most comprehensive challenge to inequalities among liberal citi-
zenship discourses, multiculturalism’s main achievement is that it amends
civic republicanism’s cultural lens with a positive valorization of minority
identity.
Civic universalism
Christian Joppke describes and endorses a notion of citizenship in which
integration is achieved via civic rights and the citizenry’s collective identi-
ﬁcation with them.55 The main task of public institutions is to uphold
institutional neutrality towards any conception of the good, and provide
a shield against oppression through particular moral norms, such as
those provided by religious outlooks. Citizenship is increasingly inﬂuenced
by international agreements and institutions, such as, for instance, the
human rights regime.
Civic universalism is inspired by a Rawlsian contractual logic. It presup-
poses citizens who have delegated decision-making power to political elites
who have responded to globalization by changing the conditions of the
social contract from redistribution to free market competition. The response
of this discourse to growing ethnic and religious diversity in Europe is an
expansion of political rights that is accompanied by the diminishing relevance
of policies of cultural accommodation and economic redistribution.
Variants of this discourse have been salient across Europe, including Britain
and Germany. In both contexts, civic universal arguments reproduce binary
distinctions between what is constructed as a ‘cultural value set’ embraced
by inherently liberal Europe, and ‘illiberal’ norms upheld by Muslim commu-
nities. As Alana Lentin observed, such an opposition between the realm of
human rights, intrinsic to the West, and that of natural justice beyond, plays
into a division into two humanities and the rationale of the ‘clash of
civilizations’.56
55 Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration.
56 Alana Lentin, ‘Postracial silences: the othering of race in Europe’, in Wulf D. Hund and
Alana Lentin (eds), Racism and Sociology (Berlin and Zurich: Lit Verlag 2014), 69–104
(73).
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Key individuals involved in the German Islam Conference, for instance,
demonstrated civic universal concerns in positioning Muslims outside the
constitutional consensus. The solicitor Seyran Ateş, who participated in the
conference’s ﬁrst round and contributes to public debates about a German
Islam, distinguishes between liberal ‘German’ and illiberal ‘Islamic’ values.57
Ateş sees the German Islam Conference, as does its initiator Schäuble, as an
opportunity to confront Muslim representatives with the binding nature of
German legal norms, and to get them to make a public commitment to
upholding them. The plenary asked Muslim participants to sign a document
endorsing the ‘values of the German constitutional order’, celebrating their
compliance as if it constituted a major break with the past.58 Frank Peter
observed that this logic presumed a paradoxical conditionality of universal-
ism, in that Muslims are seen as unﬁt to exercise their universal rights
unless they publicly afﬁrm their commitment to them.59 The expectation of
an afﬁrmation of constitutional principles reinforces stereotypes of a commu-
nity that embraces illiberal practices. Related perceptions are also produced on
a more recent online platform that the state-funded television station ARD
launched in 2015 to offer ﬁrst-hand advice to Syrian refugees. The ‘guide’ is
very informative as to what the public services think new arrivals need to
know in order ‘to understand this country and its people’.60 People who
have just survived the hardship of making it to Europe alive are told, in the
ﬁrst instance: ‘Always look the person they are talking to in the eyes.’ They
are advised that women ‘are to be respected, no matter what they wear’,
and instructed that, in Germany, ‘conﬂicts must not be solved with violence’.61
These guidelines are highly indicative of the prevalent stereotypes with which
refugees from predominantly Muslim countries are received. This civic uni-
versal lens also informed the invitation to Navid Kermani to mark the ﬁftieth
anniversary of the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (German
Basic Law) in 2014 in the Bundestag. Kermani, a novelist and participant in
the German Islam Conference, is known for advocating a ‘secular’ under-
standing of Islam. In his speech, he praised the integrative force of the
German Basic Law. While the invitation to a state ceremony signiﬁed a rela-
tively new preparedness to include Muslim voices, it also celebrated ‘role
models’ who, supposedly ‘in contrast to many Muslims’, publicly embraced
German constitutional principles.
57 Seyran Ateş, Der Multikulti-Irrtum: Wie wir in Deutschland besser zusammenleben können
(Berlin: Ullstein 2008).
58 Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Drei Jahre Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK) 2006–2009.
59 Frank Peter, ‘Welcoming Muslims into the nation: tolerance, politics and integration in
Germany’, in Jocelyne Cesari (ed.), Muslims in Europe and the United States since 9/11
(London and New York: Routledge 2010), 119–44.
60 ARD-Alpha, ‘Germany and its people’, 9 October 2015, available on the Bayerischer
Rundfunk website at www.br.de/fernsehen/ard-alpha/sendungen/punkt/germany-
understand-country-people-100.html (viewed 14 September 2017).
61 Ibid.
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In Britain Prime Minister Tony Blair argued in his post-7/7 speech that the
suicide bombers had ‘received all… the advantages’ of being brought up in
the United Kingdom yet had taken their own and other peoples’ lives in the
name of an ideology ‘alien to everything this country stands for’.62 Drawing
on a civic universal argument, he contrasted the ‘particular ideology that
arises within one religion at this one time’ to essential British values such as
‘belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all,
respect for this country and its shared heritage’.63 Political instruments
called for in the speech included measures against forced marriage, regu-
lations for Muslim schools, and the proliferation of the English language.
Prime Minister Cameron’s extremism speech, delivered nine years later,
shortly after the tenth anniversary of 7/7, reads very similarly. He too is con-
cerned about individuals who ‘don’t really identify with Britain’; he sees
extremist ideology that is part of ‘a particular faith’as a root cause of terrorism,
and describes ‘our own liberal values’ as the ‘strongest weapon’ against
extremism.64 Cameron’s list of British values, just like Blair’s or the one in
the coalition government’s integration strategy paper,65 refers exclusively to
constitutional principles. Cameron, like Blair, suggests that British values
should be enforced with greater conﬁdence, by ensuring people learn
English, and confronting ‘the horrors’of forced marriage, female genital muti-
lation and domestic violence.66 Contrasting ‘intrinsically British liberal values’
to what is generalized as ‘alien violent practices’, both speakers reinforce per-
ceptions of Islam as a mediaeval and deviant culture of oppression.
The implied connection between faith-based values and a ﬁxed behavioural
repertoire reinforces hierarchical distinctions between European supremacy
and inferior Others. In both countries, civic universal arguments ‘thicken’
the identiﬁcation with constitutional principles into a lifestyle that is allegedly
yet to be embraced by Muslim communities in Europe. Highly diverse
phenomena, such as political terrorism or violence against women, are
thereby ‘packaged’ as rooted in a set of illiberal values, and contrasted to
what is constructed as views universally embodied across Britain and
Germany, respectively, as if political or other expressions of violence were
absent in Europe.
Civic universal policies accordingly seek to strengthen the ‘democratic’
orientation of Muslim citizens. Both governments, for instance, have intro-
duced obligatory citizenship tests that require the acquisition of knowledge
about British and German history, public norms and democratic institutions.
In both settings, the Muslim consultants on the project were chosen among
those categorized as ‘moderate’, ‘liberal’ and ‘secular’, labels seen as
62 Blair, ‘The duty to integrate’.
63 Ibid.
64 ‘Extremism: PM speech’.
65 Communities and Local Government, Creating the Conditions for Integration, 4.
66 ‘Extremism: PM speech’.
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compatible with universal values. Civic universalism’s mandate for public
institutions is limited to the promotion of political rights and the identiﬁ-
cation with civic values, and thus creates little space to address economic,
political or cultural asymmetries. The discourse operates with generaliz-
ations and dichotomies that align with the logic of racial distinctions, and
thus contributes to sustaining and masking various manifestations of
inequality.
Cosmopolitanism
The inﬂuence of global capitalism on political processes is at the centre of cos-
mopolitan citizenship. Saskia Sassen’s work is concerned with a reconﬁgura-
tion of normative orders such as territory, authority and rights.67 I draw on
her ideas, admittedly reductively, to include what has gained prominence as
the ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘postnational’ argument in citizenship debates. In
Sassen’s view, the mechanism at the heart of the argument, namely suprana-
tional interventions to enforce human rights standards, is best characterized
as an aspect of wider processes of a ‘denationalization’, that is, as a qualitative
rearrangement of power constellations rather than as a ‘decline’ of the
nation-state.68
This discourse highlights how global markets, the digitalization of infor-
mation and neoliberal policies have altered the relationship between citi-
zens and political institutions. Cosmopolitan citizenship unfolds among
transnational elites who advance the maintenance of their class and politi-
cal interests, but also among social movements that mobilize internation-
ally against various forms of exclusion. The discourse describes the
ongoing reallocation of processes of decision-making to supranational
levels of policymaking, and points to a loss of steering power on the
part of governments. From this point of view, citizenship’s integrative
capacity unfolds via the enforcement of the human rights regime, which
enters national domains through supranational courts. The lobbying
process that preceded the creation of novel anti-discrimination legislation
across Europe and its enforcement through supranational courts is illustra-
tive of these dynamics.
Faced with the British government’s initial resistance to addressing the
longstanding demand by British Muslims for better legal protection from
religious discrimination, Muslim organizations and antidiscrimination
NGOs successfully lobbied European institutions to advance the desired
legal changes. A group of experts and organizations from a range of Euro-
pean countries, the so-called Starting Line Group (SLG), drafted a proposal
for a pan-European equality law that was obligatory for all member states.
67 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights.
68 Soysal, Limits of Citizenship.
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Anti-Muslim racism was the primary target of this initiative. The SLG’s
rhetoric combined an individualist human rights discourse with group-
based accommodation:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of
human rights and fundamental freedoms or participation in the political, econ-
omic, social, cultural, religious life or any other public ﬁeld on grounds of racial
or ethnic origin or religion or belief.69
Following the passing of two European directives, the British government
acted on its obligation to transpose EU-legislation into national law. Once
included in the British legal framework in 2003, the new Equalities Acts
2006/2010 brought antidiscrimination and human rights legislations together
and substantially expanded legal protection from religious discrimination,
extending it to all areas of social life and introducing a ‘public sector duty’.
This duty requires public authorities to be proactive in guaranteeing equal
treatment in all protected strands of their employment policies and the pro-
vision of their services; it also requires systematic monitoring of how public
institutions exercise their powers and ensure that all protected groups
access their services. Muslim organizations in Britain had enthusiastically
lobbied in favour of these legal reforms.
The German Equal Treatment Law (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz,
known as the AGG) was passed in 2006, and its scope with regard to discrimi-
nation on grounds of religion was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the lobbying
efforts of the Protestant and Catholic churches in Germany, rather than by
affected constituencies.70 The churches made use of their extensive political
networks on both the supranational and national levels of government to
uphold their constitutional privilege to discriminate in their organizations,
which include a substantial proportion of German welfare providers. The
European legislator limited the exemptions granted to the churches to roles
that involved the propagation of faith, while the German legislation deviated
from the directive’s intention and reintroduced the churches’ exceptional
rights granted by the German Basic Law. Currently, civil society organizations
are seeking to challenge Germany’s inadequate transposition of European
legislation via supranational institutions such as the European Commission,
the European Court of Justice, the European Agency of Fundamental Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights, which is to rule on this matter
this year.
69 Article 1.1 of the Starting Line proposal (1999), quoted in Isabelle Chopin, Campaigning
against Racism and Xenophobia: From a Legislative Perspective at European Level (Brussels:
European Network against Racism 1999), 5.
70 Aleksandra Lewicki, Social Justice through Citizenship? The Politics of Muslim Integration
in Germany and Great Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2014).
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Thus, cosmopolitanism pairs up with multiculturalism as a minority
counter-discourse. Particularly in Germany, where multiculturalism is less
established, the human rights discourse offers arguments that are considered
more legitimate. While British minorities successfully used European organiz-
ations to advance claims for legal protection from religious discrimination, the
lower levels of involvement of German Muslims in national politics also
impact on their ability to mobilize supranationally. Whereas the British Equal-
ities Act was passed in response to claims articulated by affected lobby
groups, the German Equal Treatment Law’s provisions on religion were
shaped by the lobbying of the Christian churches, which preserved their pri-
vileges to discriminate when offering a public service. Contrary to Joppke’s
observation that Germany has now introduced the same ‘anti-discrimination
policies that are currently taking hold in the rest of Europe’,71 the German
equalities framework offers, especially in comparison to the British equivalent,
limited means to challenge discrimination. Supranational institutions consti-
tute a key arena fromwhich potentially to challenge deviations from the Euro-
pean legal source. Cosmopolitanism thus highlights how minorities draw on
international arrangements to advance their political claims.72 Cosmopolitan-
ism thus invites engagement with structural barriers to political or judicial
decision-making on the national and supranational levels of governance. It
potentially also offers a global perspective on socio-economic differentials.
This discourse, however, is currently the least inﬂuential in national policy
debates on diversity.
The dynamics, blind spots and silences of citizenship
Each of the four salient citizenship discourses—civic republicanism, multicul-
turalism, civic universalism and cosmopolitanism—offers a distinct perspec-
tive on social diversity and inequality in Europe. While these discourses
have their roots in European thought, reﬂecting communitarian, pluralist,
liberal and Kantian ideas, they have evolved to a point where they provide
speciﬁc interpretations for current social problems and their political sol-
utions, notably in relation to the so-called ‘Muslim question’ in Europe.
Each of the four discourses engages with speciﬁc mechanisms of diversity
management, accentuating, for example, the need to increase social cohesion,
advance cultural diversity, promote civic identiﬁcation or apply human rights
standards. While multiculturalism and civic republicanism stress the ‘cultural’
dynamics of collective narratives and citizen’s perceptions of each other within
the national realm, civic universalism and cosmopolitanism emphasize the
‘political’ sphere of rights that is enforced within and beyond the nation-
state. The capacity of these interpretative schemes to account for a spectrum
71 Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration, 149.
72 June Edmunds, ‘The limits of post-national citizenship: European Muslims, human
rights and the hijab’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 35, no. 7, 2012, 1181–199.
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of structural inequalities is inﬂuenced by their respective focus on individual or
institutional responsibilities. Civic republicanism and civic universalism, for
instance, see institutional responsibility limited to guaranteeing civic rights
and shaping an identiﬁcation with them (and disagree on their respective
communitarian thick or liberal thin ‘content’); they tend to blame migrants’
cognitive-affective orientations or individual behaviour, and reject public
interventions that challenge cultural, political and socio-economic hierarchies.
Multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, in contrast, put public institutions in
charge of the removal of barriers to individuals’ equal standing. Policies incor-
porating multicultural arguments focus on socio-economic, political and cul-
tural asymmetries anchored in the cultural order of society. The
multicultural vision of democracy is thereby limited to national narratives
and institutions, and reinforces cultural ascriptions. Cosmopolitanism,
ﬁnally, overcomes the national boundedness of citizenship, and problematizes
global political and socio-economic inequalities, but is currently the least inﬂu-
ential discourse in debates on diversity.
Each of the four discourses offers a limited or partial challenge to structural
inequalities affecting post-migration communities in Europe. They also largely
remain silent on the ways in which ideas of race continue to structure social
relations,73 or only offer partial challenges to the structural anchoring of
race in the social order. Structural asymmetries thus remain rooted in our
current understanding of democratic citizenship.
While cosmopolitanism’s problematization of global asymmetries currently
shapes policy debates on integration only marginally, multiculturalism is,
especially in Britain, more established. Its salience and legitimacy, however,
is increasingly jeopardized by sceptical statements from high-level politicians,
which also limit the ability to advance the type of claims it entails. The most
inﬂuential discursive formations in both Britain and Germany currently are
civic republicanism and civic universalism, whose focus on cognitive orien-
tations and values informs many policy initiatives in this area.
Citizenship is continuously subject to hegemonic struggles between com-
peting discourses that impact on the scope and content of political initiatives.
Although I ﬁnd similarities (and key differences) between the use of the four
discourses in Britain and Germany, convergences (or divergences) do not
revolve around one key discursive vision of democracy, such as civic univers-
alism,74 but reﬂect a wider array of discourses and counter-discourses. While
some inﬂuential sources discussed above, such as the ‘Cantle Report’, are
exclusively shaped by a civic republican reading—although they coexist
alongside other documents that reﬂect alternative visions of democracy—
most of the analysed initiatives are inﬂuenced by a combination of different
discursive repertoires. For instance, perceived problems and political reme-
dies negotiated at the German Islam Conference or codiﬁed in the 2012
73 Lentin, ‘Postracial silences: the othering of race in Europe’.
74 As argued, for instance, in Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration.
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British integration strategy paper, Creating the Conditions for Integration, reﬂect
a mix of policy tools inspired by civic republican, civic universal and multicul-
tural narratives. The evidence discussed here, I should add, is only indicative
of the complex coexistence of and competition among the four discursive
repertoires at different stages of the emergence, negotiation and implemen-
tation of policies of diversity management.75
The comparison of consultations and lobbying processes in Britain and
Germany has thus demonstrated that Muslim populations in Germany
struggle more to access circles of decision-making and face greater barriers
to tackling structural socio-economic differentials, and that most German
Muslim organizations have yet to gain formal inclusion into what is con-
structed as the Judaeo-Christian public space. Policies targeting Muslim com-
munities differ in nuances, many of which can be explained by the two
countries’ histories of immigration, as well as distinct legal and institutional
arrangements. The fact that British governments have embraced multicultural
accommodation and equalities legislation since the 1960s, while Germany
spent most of the twentieth century encouraging return migration, certainly
has had considerable impact on these asymmetries. This analysis has,
however, also indicated that it matters which contemporary discursive under-
standing of citizenship is prevalent among actors who design a political
initiative. As integration policies move higher up on the political agenda, citi-
zenship is no longer determined by one or two speciﬁc laws and inﬂuenced by
the actions of one or two ministries, but shaped by a spectrum of laws, insti-
tutions, initiatives and actors who negotiate the contours of policy by drawing
on distinct discursive visions of democracy. It canmake a difference which dis-
cursive understanding of diversity management prevails in the negotiation,
implementation or adoption of policy. Most notably, the scope of policy
depends on whether asymmetries or disadvantages are legitimately discussed
as structural, and whether their eradication is considered as institutional
responsibility.
Rather than foregrounding the superiority and entitlement of those marked
as ‘natives’, political approaches to diversity management should explicitly
acknowledge that society, economic progress and political deliberation are
shared endeavours that involve all positionalities. Beyond ‘noting’ the persist-
ence of pervasive patterns of political under-representation and systematic
socio-economic disadvantage, political strategies need to allow the sharing
of resources and privileges.
Aleksandra Lewicki is a political sociologist with a Ph.D. from the University
of Bristol. She currently holds a postdoctoral fellowship at the Freie Universi-
tät Berlin. Her work engages with discourses and practices that iterate, perpe-
tuate or neutralize, and thereby continuously reproduce, structural
inequalities and institutional discrimination. A particular concern lies with
75 See Lewicki, Social Justice through Citizenship?.
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forms of cultural racism, such as Orientalism or Islamophobia, and the ways in
which they manifest themselves in public institutions. She is the author of the
monographs Souveränität imWandel (Lit Verlag 2005), and Social Justice through
Citizenship? The Politics of Muslim Integration in Germany and Great Britain (Pal-
grave Macmillan 2014), the editor of several volumes and journal special
issues, and a member of the editorial teams of the academic journals Ethnicities
(London) and Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen (Berlin). Email:
Aleksandra.Lewicki@fu-berlin.de
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